rulemaking to limit the companionship exemption to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the two groups' interests diverged.
Advocacy groups for home care workers, as well as lobbying groups for the minorities that comprise a significant portion of the home care worker pool, had been clamoring for minimum wage and overtime protections for years. To these groups, the denial of FLSA protections to workers constituted an injustice. 2 However, disability rights groups were concerned that the recipients of care-also historically marginalized-lacked the resources, both individually and governmentally, to cover the benefits home care workers desired, as Congress itself recognized when debating the companionship exemption. 3 The disability community argued that the DOL's failure to first ensure adequate infrastructure to support FLSA protections for workers jeopardized those receiving care. 4 Part I of this paper begins by exploring how the federal government has classified domestic workers since the inception of the FLSA. Part II explores the genesis of the companionship exemption, as well as the challenges it has faced from the legislative, judicial, and administrative branches of government. Finally, the most recent challenge to the DOL's interpretation of the home care rule, Home Care Ass'n of America v. Weil, 5 is discussed.
Subsequent parts of the paper focus on the harm that will result from implementation of the new home care rule. Part III describes why the well-being of people with disabilities is jeopardized by implementation of the rule, and details how states are grappling with the new regulatory requirements.
FLSA coverage by implementing the "companionship exemption." Exempted companions included "any employee employed on a casual basis . . . to provide babysitting services," 13 as well as those "employed . . . to provide companionship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves." 14 The Secretary of Labor was left to define the specifics. 15 In 1975, the DOL reported receiving a variety of comments in response to its proposed implementing regulations, from groups as diverse as law firms to working mothers. 16 Based on these comments, the DOL amended the final rule to: clarify that individuals engaged in a home business are not domestic service employees, simplify recordkeeping mandates for live-in caregivers, and describe timekeeping methods. 17 Perhaps most controversial, Wage and Hour Division Administrator Betty Murphy determined that third parties could avail themselves of the companionship exemption since the exemption applies to "any employee." 18 This meant that domestic service workers affiliated with agencies constituting enterprises under the FLSA would no longer be entitled to overtime and minimum wage protections.
II. CHALLENGES TO THE COMPANIONSHIP EXEMPTION
The companionship exemption has subsequently been challenged through multiple channels.
While no Congressional proposals have yet been successful in amending the exemption, that has not stopped senators and representatives from offering proposed amendments. Other challenges have come from home care workers seeking FLSA protection through litigation, as well as through administrative rulemaking efforts. This section provides a brief summary of how the exemption has been challenged since 1975. 2016 
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A. Legislative Challenges
Most recently, efforts to amend the FLSA to cover home care workers have come in the form of proposed legislative amendments.
In 2007, Representative Lynn Woolsey introduced the Fair Home Health Care Act in the House (House Bill 3582). 19 The short bill defined "casual basis" domestic service employment as "irregular or intermittent" and provided that it is neither performed by an individual whose vocation is the provision of companionship services, nor may it exceed an aggregate twenty hours per week. 20 Senator Tom Harkin introduced a similar bill in the Senate. 21 Both bills were referred to committees, where they remained. 22 Senator Robert Casey and Representative Linda Sanchez introduced the Direct Care Workforce Empowerment Act in 2010 where, again, the bills' primary purpose was limiting the companionship exemption by narrowing the scope of casual basis employment. 23 Specifically, the bills would require casual employment to be "irregular or intermittent," and disallowed such employment from being performed by an individual in a vocational capacity. 24 The bills further provided that "[e]mployment is not on a casual basis, whether performed for one or more family or household employers, if such employment for all such employers exceeds [twenty] hours per week in the aggregate." 25 The bills also directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to create a data 19 H.R. 3582, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007). 20 Id. § 2. 21 S. 2061, 110th Cong. (2007) . Notably, cosponsors of this bill included Senators Clinton and Obama. As will be discussed, the Clinton and Obama Administrations also attempted to limit the companionship exemption through administrative action. collection and monitoring program, National Advisory Council on the Direct Care Workforce, and three-year grant program designed to improve recruitment, retention, and education of the direct care workforce. 26 Neither bill made it out of committee. 27 The following June, Senator Casey and Representative Sanchez tried again, introducing the Direct Care Job Quality Improvement Act of 2011 into their respective houses. 28 These bills sought to clarify that the term "casual basis in domestic service employment to provide companionship services" means intermittent employment that is "not performed by an individual -(1) whose vocation is the provision of companionship services; or (2) who is employed by an employer or agency other than the family or household using their services." 29 In the event that a caregiver works for a family or individual more than five hours per week or for more than twelve weeks per year, the caregiver would not be considered to be working on a casual basis. 30 In addition to FLSA amendments, the bills also called for the creation of a workforce monitoring program, a data sharing program, reports on the adequacy of long-term care support for Medicaid purposes, and multiple grant programs. 31 Again, the bills were stuck after being referred to committee. 32 In The Act proposed stripping the Secretary of Labor of the authority to define and delimit the exemption. 34 A similar bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator Mike Johanns. 35 Ultimately, neither was successful.
B. Challenges through Litigation
As individuals with disabilities began leaving institutions for group homes, ambiguity remained as to whether the companionship exemption applied to community-based settings that were not necessarily private homes (e.g., group homes owned by a provider and largely funded by the state).
Even before the Supreme Court's seminal Olmstead decision, 36 courts had begun providing greater clarity regarding the companionship exemption's applicability. One of the first cases to address the issue was Lott v. Rigby. 37 There, house parents at Stephens County Independent Group Residence for the Mentally Retarded petitioned the court for overtime compensation.
However, the court determined that the companionship exemption only applied to those services provided in a private home. 38 Because the Residence was publicly funded, the house parents could not be domestic service employees. 39 Numerous cases followed. In Linn v. Developmental Services of Tulsa, Inc., the court held that to determine whether a home was private, the court should focus on the elements of control, such as whether the service provider furnished the residence, maintained a set of keys, and paid rent, as well as whether residents were related and were offered a setting similar to an institution. 40 In Madison v. Resources for Human Development, Inc., the court deemed the fact that clients did not live in the home prior to becoming clients of the service provider a significant factor in 34 43 There, a group of caregivers for individuals with developmental disabilities in multiple homes alleged that their employer violated FLSA by improperly availing itself of the companionship exemption. The court determined that housing units are part of a "continuum," and "key inquiries" in determining where on that continuum the unit lies "are who has ultimate management control of the living unit and whether the living unit is maintained primarily to facilitate the provision of assistive services." 44 Factors to be addressed are: whether the recipient of care lived in the home prior to becoming a client of the provider; who owns the home, which "is significant because it evidences control"; who maintains the home by paying the mortgage, utilities, and food; whether the recipients of care would continue living in the home if you no longer received services from the provider; the difference in the relative values of services provided and the total cost of the living unit; and whether the provider uses any part of the home for business purposes. 45 48 The appellants had received 60 hours of training in order to achieve CNA certification. 49 Appellants further requested that the court consider crediting them with additional training that had been received directly from the physicians of those receiving care. 50 Like the district court, the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument because, under Oregon law, the tasks that physicians trained the CNAs in were outside the scope of CNA competence and were instead the duties of a licensed nurse. 51 The Court determined that it would be inappropriate to reward appellants for acting outside the scope of their authority. 52 Moreover, it recognized that asking the State to account for on-the-job training and constantly reassess their employees for development would be "an administrative nightmare." 53 The nurses." 58 Additionally, the requirements for becoming a registered or practical nurse were more stringent, and included statutorily-mandated training in areas from biological sciences to nursing theory. 59 Although Cox had obtained training beyond the mandatory seventy-five hours necessary to be a home health aide in Indiana, it was "of no consequence" because the tasks she was performing did not require the additional training. 60 The court held that to avail oneself of the trained personnel exception, "a domestic service employee must not only perform services requiring the training of a registered or practical nurse, but must in fact have obtained training comparable in scope and duration to that of a registered or practical nurse." 61 Only one case involving the companionship exemption made its way to the Supreme Court, Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke. 62 At issue was whether the DOL's regulation permitting third-party employers to avail themselves of the companionship exemption was valid. 63 Coke was a caregiver that regularly worked seventy hours per week, 64 and she sought minimum wages and overtime pay from her employer, a home care agency, and its owner. 65 Coke argued that third-party employers should not benefit from the companionship exemption for three reasons. First, Coke claimed that domestic service employment is an activity limited to those employed by the recipients of care. In support of her argument, Coke argued that the Social Security Act defines "domestic service employment" as activity conducted in the home of the employer. 66 She further argued that domestic service workers used to be covered through enterprise coverage. 67 The Court deemed this 58 Id. at 1309. 59 Id. at 1310. 60 Next, Coke argued that the plain language of the thirdparty regulation conflicts with the definition of "domestic service employment," in that the latter requires the worker to be in the home of the person by whom he or she is employed. 69 The Court agreed that conflict exists, but determined that the third-party regulation governs. 70 From a practical perspective, the Court did not believe it made sense for the exemption to hinge on whether the payor resided in the same household as the individual receiving care. If the conflict was resolved as Coke desired, then family members would not be able to avail themselves of the exemption if they lived in a different household than the individual receiving care. Such was not the intent of Congress. 71 From a legal perspective, "normally the specific governs the general," meaning that the third-party regulation, the sole purpose of which is to address the issue of third-party payors, should trump the more general definitional regulation. 72 Finally, Coke took issue with the way the regulation was promulgated. 73 She argued that the third-party regulation was interpretive, and interpretive regulations cannot be used to bindingly fill a statutory gap, but are more appropriately deemed persuasive materials. 74 However, the Court found this reasoning unconvincing. 75 The DOL used formal notice and comment procedures, suggesting the regulation was meant to be as binding as any other. 76 Moreover, the regulation was within the scope of the DOL's authority and 68 Id. at 167. 69 Id. at 168. 70 Id. at 169. 71 Id. at 170. 72 Id. 73 Id. at 171-72. 74 Id. at 172. 75 Id. 76 Id. at 173.
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INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW Vol 13:2 was reasonable. 77 Coke argued that promulgation procedures were defective because notice and explanation of the regulation were inadequate. 78 The Court found that DOL complied with its legal promulgation duties. 79 Therefore, the new law of the land permitted third parties to avail themselves of the companionship exemption.
C. Administrative Challenges
In 1993, the first attempt to limit use of the companionship exemption was attempted by the Clinton Administration. 80 Specifically, the DOL published its intent to forbid third-party employers from using the companionship and live-in exemption, except for those circumstances in which the employer had a joint employment relationship with the recipient of care. 81 The rule was proposed as a mere clarification, based on the DOL's belief that the issue "may be susceptible of misinterpretation." 82 In 1995, the DOL reopened the comment period for those rules proposed in 1993. 83 Although only seven comments were received in response to the 1993 notice of proposed rulemaking, they caused the DOL to consider the potential effect the proposed rule would have on state and local governments responsible for funding companionship services. 84 Thus, the DOL specifically sought comments on permitting government entities, along with recipients of care and their family members, to avail themselves of the companionship exemption. 85 77 86 The notice of proposed rulemaking stated that the home care industry had experienced "significant changes" since 1975, such that home care workers were "performing types of duties and working in situations that were not envisioned when the companionship services regulations were promulgated." 87 Finding that the exemption no longer matched Congress's intent, the DOL again proposed excluding third-party employers from utilizing the companionship and live-in exemption. 88 The DOL also proposed redefining "companionship services" and amending qualification criteria for "trained personnel." 89 The Bush Administration withdrew the proposed rule in 2002. 90 The DOL under President Clinton stated that the proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact. 91 However, this assertion was "seriously called into question" by commenters, including the Small Business Administration and the Department of Health and Human Services. 92 The companionship exemption remained untouched until 2011, when the Obama Administration decided to revive the Clinton proposals and introduce further amendments. As in 1993, the DOL cited changes in the home care industry, including "growing demand for long-term in-home care," the "rising cost of traditional institutional care," the "availability of funding assistance for in-home care under Medicare and Medicaid," and a "significant increase in our aging 86 Today's companions are often employed by third-party agencies rather than directly by the recipient of care, 95 and many of the companions rely on the job as their primary source of income. 96 The DOL asserted that narrowing the companionship exemption would more accurately reflect congressional intent. 97 First, the DOL proposed broadening section 552.6, defining "companionship services," into four paragraphs. 98 Paragraph (a) defines "companionship services" as "the provision of fellowship and protection for a person who, because of advanced age or physical or mental infirmity, is unable to care for themselves," and goes on to define "fellowship" and "protection." 99 Paragraph (b) provides that "companionship" includes the provision of care, so long as that care is incidental in nature. 100 Incidental services constituting companionship, per the DOL, include using public transportation, going to appointments, and attending social events. 101 Other services may be deemed incidental only after a fact-intensive inquiry. For example, the DOL expects that recipients of care can schedule their bathing routines to be outside of a companion's hours. 102 Therefore, assisting a client with a bath or shower is outside the scope of companionship. However, if there is "an imminent need" for "cleansing," the DOL consider it "a reasonable but 104 Because Congress offered FLSA protection to domestic service workers such as maids, the DOL believes tasks traditionally performed by these workers should not be included within a FLSA coverage exemption. 105 As such, companions can no longer assist their clients with light housework.
Paragraph (d) eliminates from companionship services "medical care that is typically provided by personnel with specialized training." 106 The list of excluded activities is broad. Some tasks, such as blood sugar screening and the provision of physical therapy, clearly require training or direction. Yet other activities, such as "routine foot, skin, and back care" 107 appear to be just that-routine activities that require nothing more than common sense and an able body. Nevertheless, companions may not provide such assistance.
Further, the DOL eradicated the third-party companionship exemption for all parties, except "for the individual, family, or household" receiving care. 108 This means that states and other government entities involved in funding homecare may be on the hook to pay minimum wage and overtime.
It is also important to note that individuals and families receiving care are not completely isolated from the rule's reach. Recall that the scope of "companionship services" was limited. 109 Thus, if a companion fails to qualify for the exemption and the individual or family receiving care can be considered a sole or joint employer, the individual or family will be required to pay minimum wage and overtime, regardless of any previously negotiated contract. If a recipient of care needs help going to the bathroom an extra time one day, this extra care could potentially trigger the 20 percent threshold and require that individual to pay 448 INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW Vol 13:2 minimum wage and overtime. If a recipient of care eats with a feeding tube, that individual will automatically be liable for minimum wage and overtime, as assisting him triggers the medically related services provision. Finally, the DOL withdrew permission for live-in aides and employers to negotiate an employment contract in lieu of keeping a log of hours worked. 110 In fact, the proposed regulation puts complete responsibility on the employer "for making, keeping, and preserving records of hours worked and ensuring the accuracy" thereof. 111 D. Home Care Association Challenge Despite the DOL "anticipat[ing] that the proposed rule will have relatively little effect on the provision of companionship services," 112 concerns were immediately raised by home care agencies and recipients of home care services. The Home Care Association of America, the International Franchise Association, and National Association for Home Care and Hospice quickly brought an action under the Administrative Procedures Act, arguing that the proposed rules constituted an arbitrary and capricious endeavor, clearly contrary to congressional intent and delegated authority. 113 They requested an injunction, in order to continue utilizing the third-party provisions of the companionship exemption. 114 The D.C. Circuit Court held that the regulations conflict with both the legislative history and plain language of the FLSA. 115 In Step I of the Chevron analysis, the court must address whether Congress directly spoke to the question at issue. 116 court to determine whether Congress delegated authority to the executive agency to implement statute or fill a gap. 117 Judge Leon found that "Congress surely did not delegate to the Department of Labor here the authority to issue a regulation that transforms defining statutory terms into drawing policy lines based on who cut the check rather than what work is being performed." 118 Although Congress did leave some gaps to be filled by the DOL, including the definition of companionship services, once the "gaps were filled. . . , the statutory loop was closed." 119 Ultimately, by implementing regulations that Congress declined to implement by statute, the DOL engaged in "yet another thinly-veiled effort to do through regulation what could not be done through legislation. Such conduct bespeaks an arrogance to not only disregard Congress's intent, but seize unprecedented authority to impose overtime and minimum wage obligations in defiance of the plain language of Section 213." 120 Once Leon vacated the third-party employment regulation, the trade associations gained standing. The associations petitioned for emergency injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of the proposed regulations. The petition resulted in a memorandum decision from the DC Circuit Court, again written by Judge Leon.
In this second decision, Judge Leon found that while Congress did explicitly delegate to the DOL the power to define "companionship services," that delegation did "not grant it a blank check to do so in a way that contradicts the Act itself." 121 More specifically, the FLSA references companionship services in a way that makes clear such services are to be provided to individuals that cannot care for themselves. 122 Yet, the DOL's proposed regulations remove that essential care from the definition. 123 The DOL appealed, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Coke precludes the analysis ending at Step I. 127 The U.S. Court of Appeals agreed. 128 Judge Srinivasan opined that Coke placed within the DOL a "broad grant of authority" to decide whether companions employed by third parties fall within the scope of the companionship exemption. 129 While the D.C. Circuit Court was incorrect to look to unpassed legislation as evidence of congressional intent, the Supreme Court already determined that, when it comes to the inclusion of third-party employers, "the full range of potential outcomes lay within the agency's discretion." 130 Home Care Association asserted that the DOL's interpretation was arbitrary, but the Court found that the proposed regulations were "entirely reasonable." 131 Particularly, the DOL was attempting to bring FLSA protections to those employees "whose vocation is domestic service." 132 Moreover, the court determined that the heightened standard Home Care Association wanted imposed with regard to a justification for reversing forty years of contrary interpretation was inappropriate. 133 The DOL provided "a reasoned explanation" for limiting the exemption, which meets its legal burden. 134 124 Id. at 130. 125 Ultimately, the court reversed and granted summary judgment to the DOL. 135 On September 24, 2015, the trade associations petitioned Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts to stay the rule, pending disposition of a petition for certiorari. 136 Justice Roberts denied the petition on October 6, 2015.
III. EFFECTS FOR RECIPIENTS OF CARE
The 2010 census revealed that 56.7 million, or about one in five, people have a disability. 137 More than half of them consider their disability to be severe. 138 Almost 10 million noninstitutionalized people indicated the need for assistance with one or more activities of daily living. 139 These activities include tasks like dressing, toileting, and preparing meals. Thus, there is a great need for the services of home care workers.
Indeed, given the reliance of people with disabilities on their caregivers, the home care rule has the potential to negatively affect them.
A. Delivery of Services
In order to understand how the home care rule will affect the quality and amount of care received by people with disabilities, it is necessary to examine the methods through which these services are delivered. Home care is funded through a variety of sources, including private pay by individuals and families and via government insurance programs. Approximately three-quarters of home care expenditures are paid by Medicare and Medicaid. 140 135 Id. at 1097. Medicaid is not required to cover home health care, 141 though most states have chosen to fund home care through a variety of methods. 142 Traditionally, Medicaid beneficiaries receiving personal care in community settings have received services from a third-party home health agency that manages their care. 143 Under this system, the agency is responsible for hiring and firing caregivers, seeking payment, and addressing any problems that arise. 144 The state provides payment to the agency for this service.
In self-directed care programs, also known as consumerdirected care, the recipient of care is responsible for taking on many of the tasks historically performed by home care agencies. 145 Payment of these caregivers depends on the type of system the state has adopted. 146 Sometimes, the recipient of care is responsible for paying their caregiver and completing taxes. 147 Other times, the state will contract with a fiscal intermediary that handles payroll and taxes. 148 Regardless of the program's particulars, consumer-directed care is growing. 150 This means that even if states were willing to bolster already-stretched Medicaid budgets, in order to cover the additional costs of minimum wage and overtime, it is too late. It is unlikely that agencies will be reimbursed beyond current Medicaid reimbursement rates for the foreseeable future. This means home health agencies will be required to eat the cost of the rule's new burdens or cease Medicaid participation.
The situation is even more complex for states offering Medicaid beneficiaries the opportunity to participate in consumer-directed services. States will be required to conduct an analysis to determine whether managed care organizations and fiscal intermediaries participating in these programs constitute a joint employment relationship. The DOL issued guidance on joint employment relationships, indicating that an economic realities analysis must be conducted. 151 Elements of this analysis include "whether the potential employer has the power to hire and fire the employees, supervise and control the employees' work, determine the rate of payment, maintain employment records, and control where the work is performed." 152 In the event that the relationship constitutes joint employment, a state must be vigilant not only of how many hours an employee works for each Medicaid beneficiary, but also whether the cumulative hours of each Medicaid beneficiary served by the employee will trigger minimum wage and overtime protection. Even if an employee provides caregiving services for less than 40 hours per week to multiple Medicaid beneficiaries, States must also calculate travel time between beneficiaries' homes and include it in the worker's hours. 153 Given the parameters of existing budgets, states are trying to develop creative solutions for implementing the Rule. Unfortunately, these solutions may come at the expense of the recipients of care, as discussed in the sections below. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has released documents "strongly urg [ing] states to ensure that overtime or travel costs beyond an individual's control not be deducted from the individual's self-directed budget." 154 That is, a recipient of care should not be forced to forgo services while a caregiver is driving to or from their home.
The DHHS and the Department of Justice also released a joint "Dear Colleague Letter" reminding states of their obligation under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to provide those services that permit individual with disabilities to live in the least restrictive environment. 155 In particular, the agencies recognized that states are planning to put a 40-hour cap on the amount of services that can be provided by any given worker. They warned that "implementation of across-the-board caps risks violating the ADA if the caps do not account for the needs of individuals with disabilities and consequently places them at serious risk of institutionalization or segregation. From the beginning, the DOL has failed to recognize the magnitude of the changes it has mandated. The notice of proposed rulemaking anticipated "that the proposed rule will have relatively little effect on the provision of companionship services." 158 Yet, it admits that there is "almost no data . . . that can directly be used to model the market for companionship services." 159 Additionally, " [d] ue to the sometimes informal nature of the consumer-directed employment arrangements, there are no data on the total number of customers under this model, and there is limited information on the total number of providers." 160 Instead of conducting a thorough market analysis, the DOL concluded that, because 14 states currently provide some type of minimum wage or overtime protection to companions, "objections raised in the past regarding the feasibility and expense of prohibiting third parties from claiming the companionship and live-in worker exemptions" are negated. 161 This fact is misleading because not all fourteen states provide the complete protection mandated under the new rule. 162 It also ignores the fact that those 157 This is especially ironic considering that the expenses of Olmstead litigation, and even institutionalized care itself, are greater financial burdens for states than the provision of a good home-and community- states chose to implement the protections, and consequently had the opportunity prepare for implementation. 163 The DOL, while perhaps not aware of the severity of changes, was aware that home care agencies will need to make significant changes in order to comply with the new regulation. It offered three operational choices to these agencies:
First, the agency might manage existing staff to reduce overtime hours while managing the same caseload and staffing levels. . . . Second, as suggested in the City of New York's amicus brief, agencies might choose not to allow staff to exceed 40 hours per week. . . . The third scenario comprises a mix of the first and second approach. Neither of those approaches is costless to agencies, therefore, agencies will weigh the costs of hiring additional workers with the cost of paying overtime to existing workers to determine the optimal mix of overtime a new hires approximate to their circumstances. 164 Easier said than done.
In an amici brief, multiple States argued that "the operational viability" of the Medicaid program has been threatened, "both in letter and spirit." 165 2016 457 HELP THAT HURTS: HOW DOL'S HOME CARE RULE HARMS PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND CAREGIVERS companionship hours. 166 Virginia proposed a fifty-six hour cap and requiring providers of companionship services to have a single employer. 167 Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and New York-a few of the states the DOL looks to as proof that the home care rule will be effective-openly acknowledge capping hours. 168 Individuals receiving care will not simply stop needing to go to the bathroom after receiving 40 hours of care. Ratherand assuming they are provided the extra assistance-these individuals will have to invite more strangers into their homes. As disability rights activists maintain: "[p]ersonal autonomy and bodily integrity are fundamental human rights. Our courts have upheld these rights in a variety of situations where others have sought to regulate an individual's body." 169 Likewise, laws against assault and battery "protect individuals from experiencing unwanted touching from another person. However, under the new rule, disabled people will be forced to allow unwanted touching by new attendants if they want to live in the community." 170 Legal scholars brush over this argument. Molly Biklen writes, "[t]he commodification of caregiving and the growth of the home healthcare industry suggest that there is no longer a core of intimate personal services to be protected by an exemption." 171 Tell that to the elderly woman who needs help cleaning up after she could not quite make it to the restroom on time. Tell the transgendered man who needs assistance changing his clothes that it is no big deal who sees his surgical scars. 172 The CDPAP is the gem of the Medicaid program. It is quintessentially American. It is about liberty. In the CDPAP, the individual, not the agency, decides when to get up, when to take a bath, when to get dressed, and when to go to bed. The individual decides who to let into his or her own home. The individual decides how services are delivered. The individual decides who can touch his or her body. The individual is in charge of his or her own life. 174 If a fiscal intermediary is forced to cap caregiver hours under the new rule, participants will lose vital autonomy.
In certain situations, individuals may lose caregivers altogether. Consider Arkansas again, which has considered forbidding caregivers from serving more than one client with a disability. 175 These caregivers, in order to make a living, are going to seek out those clients that need a number of 173 hours of service as close to the maximum as possible. 176 Yet many people with disabilities only need-or have only been approved for-as few as two or three hours of service per day. Services received during these hours are often crucial, entailing, for example, getting out of bed in the morning or getting transported to work. But, unless these individuals find caregivers willing to earn minimum wage for fifteen hours per week, they may be stuck in bed. 177 The DOL answered advocates' concerns by advancing the position that continuity of care is already diminished because "low wages, poor or nonexistent benefits, and erratic and unpredictable hours" result in high caregiver turnover. 178 It claims that, in some locations, the turnover rate is 100%. 179 These extreme statistics are questionable on their face. Disability advocacy groups furthermore recognize that, in gathering turnover rate data, the DOL combined post-acute, long-term, and consumer-directed care statistics. 180 This amalgam is improper because post-acute care is, by its nature, not designed to be sustained. 181 Regardless of whether continuity of care is already poor, the home care rule threatens to exacerbate the problem. Kansas told the court that it has a shortage of home care workers available in its rural communities. 182 Other states lack a sufficient number of caregivers to assist recipients of care for whom spoken English is not the primary language. 183 Individuals requiring care in these situations are already at 176 Presumably, this maximum will be 40 hours per week. 177 Or, of course, get forced into an institution. 178 extreme risk of being institutionalized. Limiting the pool of available care by placing a limit on the number of hours that each caregiver may work is dangerous for people who need the care and is also against the interests of the caregivers themselves.
IV. CONSEQUENCES FOR HOME CARE WORKERS
The home care rule was promulgated for the benefit of those who have devoted their career to caregiving. The DOL cited "significant changes in the home health care industry over the last 35 years" as justification for the amendments. 184 Advocates for the inclusion of domestic service workers into FLSA's protective fold argue that the work is "at the very least, thankless," and, at best, "despised and low class." 185 By offering caregivers FLSA protection, by recognizing their job duties as valuable, and by treating them like other professionals, advocates argue, caregiver status is improved. But is this actually the case?
Both the DOL and labor advocates fail to recognize the role of the caregiver as unique. Caregivers are valued by those for whom they care. Indeed, without assistance from a caregiver, many individuals with disabilities would not be able to get out of bed in the morning. That an individual with a disability is so dependent upon a caregiver to provide necessary assistance with intimate activities of daily living creates a relationship beyond the typical employer-employee exchange. Caregivers do more than assist their employers routine job duties; instead, they assist them in living life. It is crucial that any regulations affecting home care take this dynamic into account.
Moreover, although the home care rule may sound good to some labor advocates in theory, the regulations do not guarantee that caregivers will actually receive higher wages. As discussed in Part III, the DOL actually provides employers with workarounds to avoid paying caregivers 2016 461 HELP THAT HURTS: HOW DOL'S HOME CARE RULE HARMS PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND CAREGIVERS increased wages. 186 Lessons from states currently attempting to implement the home care rule demonstrate that caregivers may actually have decreased wages and autonomy, as explored in Section B.
A. Home Care Worker Representation
It is not evident why the Obama Administration believed amending the regulations was appropriate. Although it cited a growing demand for care, as well as increased government funding, the DOL failed to make a case that the actual nature of home care has changed. As Congress members opposing the changes noted, "shortchanging workers," 189 promoting "a legal fiction," 190 or a codification of "the legacy of slavery." 191 It is true that many home care workers fit within at least one category typically viewed as marginalized. Per DOL statistics, the average caregiver is a female in her mid-40s. 192 There is approximately a 40% chance that she is AfricanAmerican or Hispanic, and, in some regions, a fair chance that she is foreign-born. 193 These statistics also mean there is a great chance that many of these caregivers voted for Obama. 194 Indeed, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) was a top contributor to the Obama campaign, raising more money for Democratic candidates in 2012 then Obama's biggest political action committee. 195 463 HELP THAT HURTS: HOW DOL'S HOME CARE RULE HARMS PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND CAREGIVERS Home care workers began organizing in the mid-1980s. 196 The first states to organize were Oregon, Washington, Illinois, and Massachusetts. 197 Maryland, Missouri, Connecticut, Vermont, and Minnesota were next. 198 Through collective bargaining, home care workers in these states were able to negotiate some combination of healthcare, training, paid time off, grievance procedures, transportation, and benefits. 199 For example, in some California counties, a home care worker receives healthcare, training, free use of public transportation, and the opportunity to grieve about adverse employment determinations. 200 However, these benefits come with a cost, sometimes to the recipient of care. The demands of organized labor are often at odds with the consumer-directed care model. Not only does an individual receiving care need to work with strangers in completing activities of daily living, but, in organized states, they are forced to invite yet another strange party into their private sphere. Each additional group that receives a voice in the care delivery discussion diminishes autonomy available to the recipient of care.
Although the SEIU may believe caregivers should have the right to appeal terminations, that means individuals receiving care may be stuck working with a caregiver that was terminated for an egregious error. Perhaps an omission caused the caregiver to injure her client. Surely, the injured party should not be forced to maintain such a dangerous situation. Granted, a consumer-directed care employer may terminate a caregiver for reasons unrelated to poor conduct, and possibly even for reasons over which the caregiver has no fault. But, recall that the recipient of care needs to feel comfortable with the individual assisting him or her with the most personal of tasks. 196 Similarly, labor scholar Peggie Smith complains that the Occupational Safety and Health Act does not adequately protect employees engaged in the provision of consumerdirected care. 201 She argues that home care workers have "no protection from various hazards including dangerous household objects, exposure to blood or other infectious material, and injuries occasioned by lifting and moving clients." 202 Yet going into homes and touching disabled, elderly, and potentially ailing bodies are essential functions of home care work. Smith appears to prefer that homes be treated as office buildings, and that clients subscribe to a strict union-approved protocol. Whether or not a Hoyer lift is a pain in the butt-or literally causes pain-for recipients of care is inconsequential, as long as protocols are in place.
Union activity also has costs for employees. Part of this cost comes from the collection of dues. Until the Supreme Court issued its 2014 decision in Harris v. Quinn, unions were collecting fair share dues from caregivers that had no desire to join. 203 In less than 18 months, approximately 30,000 home care workers ended their membership in SEIU Healthcare Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and Kansas. 204 This mass exodus from the union's rolls suggests that perhaps SEIU was not speaking for most home care workers.
Indeed, union contracts have cost some home care workers wage-earning hours. In early 2015, SEIU negotiated with the State of Minnesota to set a $10.75 minimum wage for personal care attendants. 205 Minnesota resident Scott Price explained that he would have to cut back hours of care 465 HELP THAT HURTS: HOW DOL'S HOME CARE RULE HARMS PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND CAREGIVERS received by his daughter, a 23-year-old with cerebral palsy, because he could not afford to pay the higher minimum wage for those hours she was asleep. 206 As he explained, "The burden falls back on the family in terms of caring for a child with a disability[.]" 207 The Prices are not alone; few families are in a position to afford the $94,170 price tag that now comes with a year of 24-hour care in Minnesota.
The situation in Minnesota is illuminating for two reasons. First, as Mr. Price states, despite claims about increased professionalization of the caregiving workforce, much of the responsibility for caregiving falls to family members. 208 Some of this care is unpaid. However, consumer-directed care provides a unique opportunity for family members to receive payment for caring for a loved one with a disability. The DOL, for example, notes that California "has a high percentage of caregivers who are paid family members." 209 In Michigan, approximately half of the independent providers are related to recipients of care. 210 That many caregivers are related to their employer diminishes the validity of accusations that these workers are treated deplorably. It also means that many of these workers feel intruded upon by increased regulatory and professional oversight, just as their employers do. They do not want union members to come to their homes and conduct inspections. 211 Nor are such workers interested in being trained regarding the care of a loved one. 212 Additionally, many of these
